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The Crisis and the Changing Face of the State 
 
By Andrea Borghini

 
 
This paper provides a broad reflection on the transformation of State power in times 
of crisis. Starting from the extensive sociological literature that has been produced on 
this topic, this paper aims to answer questions such as: how does the crisis affect and 
(if at all) change the role of the State? Is a crisis an opportunity for the State to recover 
some of its historical powers? Or does it result in its definitive decline? Which kind of 
State emerges, during a time of crisis, in southern European countries? In order to 
answer these questions, this paper introduces the notion of the State as conceptualised 
in the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Based on this strong categorical perspective, this 
paper discusses and takes a stand between the two "parties", i.e., those that advocate 
the end of the State and those who demand a greater presence of this political 
institution in times of crisis. What emerges, in our analysis, is a different perspective 
of the State: a State unlocked from the nation and outside of a territorial trap, a State 
as a flexible and adaptable construction, not necessarily a coherent, unitary and 
autonomous actor. The paper ends with some reflections on the concept of crisis. 
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Introduction  
 
The relationship between Crisis and the State is historically ambivalent. 
While it is true that the State is currently in crisis, it is just as true that the 
notion of Crisis has accompanied the State, the political category of modernity, 
ever since its birth. Indeed, the State emerged in the aftermath of a historical 
crisis, that which put an end to the religious wars and saw the uprising of two 
great institutions, the Papacy and the Empire. With the end of the Thirty Years’ 
War and the Peace of Westphalia which gave rise to the modern map of the 
European states, the State obtained the monopoly of the "political" (Schmitt 1995). 
The Nation-State changed form over time, seeing its secondary characteristics 
(Poggi 1990) changing and assuming a range of variations, which we can define as 
an internal crises: there is a shift from the absolute State to the liberal democratic 
State, and then, in some cases, to the totalitarian State. This means that there is 
now a well-established form of the State, based on the territory-population-
sovereignty triad, but that some of these characteristics or their relations with 
other aspects (citizenship, the nation, civil society) change. 
The State, which grew between the XIX and XX century (Le Galès and 
King 2011)
1
, became the most widespread political form in the world, also due 
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1
 "The twentieth century is the century of the growth of the State’s capacity for intervention, 
which is manifested in multiple domains and in increasingly specific ways, which the Italian 
Weberian sociologist Gianfranco Poggi calls the cycle of the State. The contemporary State now 
accounts for around 45% of GDP in the large countries specified. This growth has translated 
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to its export with arms into non-European countries. In the mid-1970s, the 
State entered a phase of crisis, although some particularly attentive authors saw 
these signs as early as the 1950s (Arendt 1951).  
The current crisis, representing the most serious crisis that the Nation-State 
has experienced since its founding, and which has substantially altered many 
roles and functions, is turning out to be a profound crisis, but one that will not 
cause its demise – today we can affirm this with certainty (Le Galès and King 
2011)
2
 – but rather open up the way for further transformations and developments. 
In other words, with respect to the State, today’s crisis should be considered 
by taking up the classic definition of crisis as an opportunity. In this regard, 
Bordoni notes the following:  
 
"because it requires a change [the crisis] may be a re-birth after a break. This 
means separation, of course, but also opportunity of choice, of decision and 
therefore an occasion to express an opinion […] that is, it is the factor that 
makes way for change, which prepares us for the future restructuring on new 
foundations" (Bauman and Bordoni 2015: 5).  
 
Therefore, we need to orient our reflections with the awareness that if we 
need to speak of the end, it does not mean the end of the State tout court, but 
rather the end of a certain configuration of the State and a certain idea of the 
State; and that we are witnessing the emergence of different definitions and ideas 
of the State that have partly broken with the past. 
In that sense, while literature on the State is quite extensive and varied, and 
obviously difficult to summarise, and after years of being characterised by a 
division between those sceptical that the State is coming to an end and those 
convinced of its decline, today it seems to rely on the same assumption: we should 
not be speaking of the end of the State, but rather of its crisis and transformation. 
In support of this affirmation, several research projects have been developed on 
this matter at an international level. To cite only a few, there has been the 
Research Group at the University of Bremen (TranState) or the Research Group 
organised by LSE3, etc.  
Reading certain studies and hearing certain positions, it almost seems that 
the institution of the State still holds too much importance to think that we can 
rid ourselves of it. It almost seems that its hold on the collective imagination 
which someone once described as bad – Beck (2003): the iron grip of the state 
on social imagination – is turning out to be something to reflect upon and which 
                                                                                                                                                         
into public policies which regulate, change and structure society in its most varied and differentiated 
domains" (455). 
2
 "It seems like a long time ago when some celebrated (and others agonised about) its coming 
decline, deemed inevitable by many scholars" (458). 
3 
About the Research Group by the University of Bremen, see the books Transformations of the 
State?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005 and Transforming the golden age nation 
State?, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. About the LSE Crisis States Research Network, see 
the Report Meeting the Challenges of Crisis States (2012). 
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also has positive aspects (Maier 2012)4, both due to the functions that the State 
tends to perform, for example, at a level of governance and power that has now 
become transnational, and due to the new roles that it tends to take on, as well 
as because of the historical characteristics that it has assumed and which today, 
in the so-called post-state phase or the Leviathan 2.0 phase, it seems to be possible 
to reconstruct with greater critical detachment. 
Therefore, the crisis is important for the State for another reason as well: 
because it makes it possible to reveal aspects of State action and of its definition 
which, in turn, demonstrate the need for extremely important theoretical and 
historical revisions, in order to grasp the resistance and persistence of this 
institution and the capacities it has shown to adapt to new global political and 
economic scenarios. 
One of the questions at the centre of our reflection (crisis as opportunity or 
as the decline of the State?) therefore finds an articulated response: a crisis can 
be a factor for reform, an occasion for the revival of the State (Delwaide 2011), 
or at least some of its aspects. It can help us better understand the nature of that 
institution. While the crisis marks the decline of certain State functions (single 
centre of political power, guarantor of economic nationalism), in other ways it 
leads us to discover other functions of the State and to fix our attention on 
theoretical aspects that until now have remained in the background. 
In that sense, in recent years, alongside empirical research, some of which 
is cited above, theoretical reflections have emerged in the literature meant to 
question the genesis of the State, the functions it performs and its outlooks. At 
times these appear to be complementary, and at times in conflict.  
 
 
The Perspective of Pierre Bourdieu 
 
One of the most interesting perspectives is that offered by sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu. 
Although the topic of the State occupied the French thinker continuously 
only in his later years, in some ways it seems to summarise his entire theoretical 
and methodological system. 
It is not possible to exhaustively present here the entire development of the 
Bourdesian reflection on the State, rather we will limit to mentioning its main 
defining features.  
Bourdieu’s notion of the State can be substantially drawn from the volume 
that collects the courses he taught on this topic at the College de France (2012), 
and from certain essays and articles he wrote in the second part of his intellectual 
career. 
Even the definition that Bourdieu chooses is emblematic of his particular 
relationship with the classics:  
                                                          
4
 "States protected vulnerable individuals and communities. They provided the legal carapace 
for the soft bodied creature of humanity, lying exposed to the cruel and rapacious or even just 
profit–seeking and zealous. Power and violence don’t disappear when states are feeble; rather 
they are exercised without the restraint of law" (Maier 2012: 306).  
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"the State is something to be determined (X) which successfully claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical and symbolic violence over a 
definite territory and over the totality of the corresponding population" 
(Bourdieu et al. 1994: 3). 
 
The idea of symbolic violence is an only apparently marginal addition, 
which in reality revolutionises the classic Weberian definition. This is because, 
later on, Bourdieu will say that it is symbolic violence which enables physical 
violence, as well as because it opens up a new line of research about the State, 
from a historical-genealogical perspective, which no longer studies coercion in 
and of itself, but rather the historical and cognitive grounds of the particular 
legitimacy on the basis of which the State exercises coercion. 
Bourdieu therefore insists on a genealogical vision of the State, the only 
one capable of enabling the scientific observer to get round the risk of using the 
language of the State to speak about the State, thereby making the reflection 
critically unproductive: 
 
"to endeavour to think the state is to take the risk of taking over (or being 
taken over by) a thought of the state, i.e. of applying to the state categories 
of thought produced and guaranteed by the state and hence to misrecognize its 
most profound truth […] one of the major powers of the state is to produce 
and impose (especially through the school system) categories of thought that 
we spontaneously apply to all things aspects of the social world–including the 
state itself" (Bourdieu et al. 1994: 1).  
 
In that sense, Bourdieu has a strong tendency to overcome Marxist positions 
(when for example he claims that Marxists tell us what the State does, but they 
are unable to tell us what the State is) and to offer an anti-substantialist reading 
of the State, which is instead connected with relational sociology, typical of his 
innovative theoretical and empirical approach. 
In other words, the State is presented as a collective belief, as a shared 
principle on the sense of the social world, for how we perceive it, in highly 
differentiated societies; as an instituting institution that progressively aspires to 
obtain the monopoly of the universal. When speaking of how the State operates, 
through acts of the State, this reveals its nature as a well-grounded illusion. 
Bourdieu wonders about the mystery of the ministry (ministry in the sense that 
it wields over a person a power that is not its own) or the ways in which the State 
presents itself to the general public as the holder of the monopoly over the right 
to consecration and delegation. 
The result is an identikit of the State which is partially different from what 
we are used to, and which lies within a very recent tradition of thought, of 
which Bourdieu is one of the pioneers, which attempts to overcome the classical 
literature belonging to the "work of Norbert Elias or the comparative 
macrosociology of Charles Tilly, or even Weberian sociology. Indeed, these 
conceptualisations now show their limits" (Le Galès and King 2011: 452). The 
symbolic aspect of power is underscored, through the notions of symbolic 
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violence, the symbolic capital over which the State holds a monopoly. Emphasis is 
also placed on the role of State practices (acts of the State), which create a singular 
connection with the reflections of an author like Popitz (1992) with regard to 
processes for the institutionalisation of power. Durkheim with his The Elementary 
Forms of Religious Life (2008) is taken up once again to make the State – 
through "the thought of the State", a notion which we view as being quite close 
to the methodological nationalism of U. Beck (2003) – the guarantor of logical 
and moral conformism, for example through the control of public time; or its 
placement at the apex of collective meaning-making, of the production of 
collective beliefs regarding the social world. 
It is clear that this is a very ambitious an risky field of research (in many 
instances Bourdieu does not conceal these risks) which also presents 
contradictions and sows doubt – for example, it is not completely clear whether 
the State is a substance, a Deus absconditus, or a field – and this is a perspective 
that prefers to focus on the reasons for conformism and the legitimation of 
power, instead of on constriction. 
Aside from the debates, some heated, which each writer spawns, with 
Bourdieu the sociology of the State can no longer be the same and his perspective 
of the State introduces radical innovating elements in the revival of the debate, 
which we are seeing today, about this institution. 
The Bourdesian perspective brings us back to the cognitive dimension of 
State power, to symbolic forms of power, which are even more important than 
physical forms: symbolic power, symbolic violence, collective belief, etc.  
In the current period, in which classic institutional categories are being 
overcome, characterised by the disconnection between social space and political 
institutions, the polycentrism of powers, the Bourdesian approach has the value 
of bringing daily life back to the centre of inquiry, as a privileged place where 
we can discover the dramas of power and State action. It is positioned as a 
privileged perspective from which to study power, for example in a dialectic to 
be (re)discovered with Foucault.  
 
 
Convergent Perspectives? 
 
There is another element that makes Bourdieu’s notion of the State 
particularly interesting: it is the harmonies that can be identified with other 
writers who either reference Bourdieu or work autonomously to overcome certain 
theoretical positions and innovate upon the panorama of studies on the State, 
often with a pragmatic motivation: understanding what that institution has become 
today, why it resists attempts to overcome it and the forms it takes on.  
We refer to the works of Mann (1986) with the notion of infrastructural 
power, Steinmetz (1999), the first to sense the link between the State and Cultural 
studies, Chernilo (2007), who discusses "methodological nationalism" and 
highlights certain ambivalences associated with the nature of the State, Bevir 
and Rhodes (2010), who see the State as a cultural practice, and Jessop (2016). 
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who, in a recent publication, revisits the idea of the State and proposes a new 
reading of it, that of the State as a social relation, to name just a few. 
These perspectives, which cannot be aggregated within an organic paradigm, 
help us understand several things: 
 
 They offer an explanation of the capacity of the State to adapt to global 
logics, for example by dissolving its ontological dimension into a 
relational dimension (Jessop 2016); 
 They bring to light certain new basic features: for example, the state-
territory split, flexibility, ambivalence, separation between the state and 
the nation (Bevir and Rhodes 2010, Brenner 1999); 
 They introduce an aspect yet to be investigated linked to the symbolic 
functions of State power which until this time have remained latent 
(Steinmetz 1999); 
 They attempt to overcome the classic state-society dialectic (well-
grounded fictions which have now become old, also according to 
Steinmetz 1999). 
 
In our view, these authors and their approaches constitute a powerful tool 
for interpreting the trajectory of the State and they revitalise a debate which for 
quite some time, especially after the eruption of globalisation, seemed to languish 
in antithetical, inflexible and fruitless positions. Both those in favour of 
globalisation, who historically see the State as an enemy of market forces and 
cheer for globalisation as the hangman of the State or at least as a process that 
has reduced it to an ancillary role, and those according to whom the State will 
never become extinct, as it is closely allied with processes of globalisation, 
seem to share the same prejudice about the State, which is seen as a monolith, 
an actor which is at times autonomous, but also mechanical, at times the slave 
of the market and at times an ally.  
Let’s look at a concrete example: in a recent publication, Bauman and 
Bordoni (2015) speak of the crisis of the State as a crisis of the relationship 
between power and politics, as the State’s inability to meet the demands of the 
citizens and face the economic crisis. Compared to the crisis of 1929 in which 
the Keynesian state reacted by increasing public policies and investing, today 
the States are too indebted to invest and they "limit themselves" to cutting, and 
these cuts are paid for in terms of costs by the citizens. Although the two 
writers’ analysis appears to be reasonable when it goes through the reinforcement 
of statehood in the 1900s through, for example, the construction of social policies, 
the diagnosis appears to be less convincing with respect to the State’s impotence, 
which has grown progressively from the 1970s onward, and has been generated 
substantially by the separation between politics and power (States continue to 
be political entities, but power has shifted elsewhere, to large multinational 
companies or global organisations), as the pessimism of these writers derives 
from their awareness of the impossibility for the State to act as it once did. It 
almost seems like they share the prejudice common to many of those who 
remain linked to a paradigm of the State that evidently has had its day, but the 
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effort of academics and policymakers today is to innovate upon the panorama, 
not irrespective of the State, but by going back to its definition and focusing on 
a less uniform and monolithic view of its nature and its action. Indeed, today 
the State acts in any event – look at the case of Europe, or of other non-western 
scenarios. The issue is to understand whether this is a rear-guard action – for 
example, in the management of the migrant issue – or a metamorphosis under 
way. From the scientific perspective, wouldn’t it be more useful to underscore 
the power-politics divide as well as the dialectic between material power and 
symbolic power that is instead still alive and well?5. It almost seems like the 
writers’ bet on a monolithic State prevents them from understanding the 
ambivalences connected to the State while incorporating, for example, Castel 
(2004) with his contribution of some time ago, in which the sociologist traces 
the State’s intrinsic ambivalence back to its historical origins. In this regard, 
with respect to a hot topic like security, on which many States are betting their 
very survival, the French sociologist first of all affirms that the problem of 
security-insecurity is not a modern one; it was born in a certain sense with the 
rise of the liberal State, and goes back to that incessant struggle between 
individual freedom and State protection. What we are living through today, in 
terms of expectations towards the security-providing State, are merely escape 
hatches which bring about nothing, and which avoid the problem. The call to 
the State for increased security in reality conceals a need for the State tout 
court and of its multi-secular policy of defence of individual safety:  
 
"the individual demands that the state protect him […] so the request of 
state appears truly much stronger in modern society than in previous ones 
[…]. Pressure is exerted, today, only on the State, except then to criticize it 
for being too intrusive. But if we want to be a State of laws, then this 
attempt to reach total protection can only disappoint, since total security is 
not compatible with absolute respect of the legal forms" (Castel 2004: 35).  
 
And later on he notes:  
 
"the contemporary individual has been deeply forged by state regulations. 
He is unable to […] stand on his feet by himself, since it is as if he has 
been reduced to putty by the collective systems of security set up by the 
social state. Unless one wants to exalt a return to a state of nature, in other 
words a state of total insecurity, bringing into question forms of protection 
cannot lead to their suppression, but rather to their redistribution in the 
new conjuncture" (Castel 2004: 35). 
 
Castel therefore concludes that the topic is more complex, and that the search 
for absolute security is in conflict with the notions forming the basis of a state 
                                                          
5
 I refer to those economic, environmental and terrorist crises, which have occurred with a certain 
frequency in recent years, in which we demand more State, as it is seen as protection from events 
now deemed incontrollable which directly or indirectly impact our countries. 
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of laws, and risks transforming itself into a security-driven impulse that elects 
certain individuals or already-marginalized social clusters as scapegoats.  
These two brief passages, taken from a recent publication on the State 
show visions that are, in a certain sense, opposites: on one hand the traditional 
view of the State as the only guide of society, and on the other hand the 
historical contradictions, intrinsic in the nature of the State, which can be found, 
for example, within the dialectic between the State and the individual. 
Both readings converge upon one point: it is necessary "to return to the 
State", at least in terms of bringing its definition and its nature back into the 
realm of public debate.  
  
 
Conclusion 
 
Therefore, the merit of a renewed debate underlying the sociology of the 
State lies precisely in freeing the debate itself – although with all of the required 
precautions: we are not speaking of repudiating ones faith to embrace another – 
from sterile contrasts, born of ways of thinking that are strongly anchored in 
tradition, and pushing into the global scene that has changed so radically with 
respect to the past methods of interpretation that are useful for understanding 
certain processes which are otherwise incomprehensible. The same Le Galès 
we have already referred to, notes in a very dense introduction to an essay on 
the State in the Revue française de Sociologie how the State shows undoubted 
capacity to recompose its action "by highlighting the logics of its vertical and 
horizontal expansion, the blurring of borders and the muddle of networks" (Le 
Galès and King 2011: 461), and how there are multiple lines of research that 
are developed which are oriented towards delinking the State from the territory, 
from the nation, towards understanding its capacity to adapt in the context of 
globalisation, beyond the contrasting views which see it as an institution that is 
either a slave to its capital or that is totally autonomous from it. Le Galès prefers to 
speak of a path:  
 
"the processes of extending the market sphere, of globalisation and of 
financialisation destroy the State’s capacity to control, regulate and sanction 
economic actors. To the contrary, these processes increase interdependencies 
between the States; they exacerbate conflicts between the actors of capitalism 
and the States" (Le Galès and King 2011: 467).  
 
In addition, these lines of research revitalise the debate in this area and 
generate multiple empirical studies, as well as a broad debate on the functions 
of the State and on the various definitions that may be proposed (culturalist, 
constructivist, etc.). 
Today, views of the State seem to be free of ideological veils and fitting to 
understand the State in its genesis, in its historicity, making it possible to 
follow its trajectories of development, based on historical and political contexts. 
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We have tried to respond to some of our initial questions: the crisis can be 
an opportunity for the State, in terms of rethinking its conceptual architecture, 
and in terms of its roles and functions in the global landscape.  
In particular on the conceptual level, the crisis frees up a series of 
perspectives, amongst which the Bourdesian appears to be particularly useful 
and heuristically fertile. 
A question that is certainly not secondary remains before us: in what 
practical terms can these theories help us understand the concrete processes of 
stateless and stateness, for example in Europe or in southern Europe? 
We can answer this question in two ways: practically and theoretically. 
From the practical point of view, we can look at specific trends, and then we 
can cite empirical studies which, based on the theoretical framework we have 
set up, are developed to grasp State trends on the field (Le Galès and King 2011). 
We can cite the studies of Jessop who reveals the difficulties that the traditional 
theory encounters when it compares the State and Globalisation, when both are 
understood as organic, unitary actors. Indeed, the sociologist notes on one hand 
how Globalisation  
 
"is not a single causal mechanism with a universal, unitary logic. It comprises 
a hypercomplex, continuously evolving result of many events, processes, 
and transformations – a result that is multicentric, multiscalar, multitemporal, 
and multiform" (Jessop 2016: 191)  
 
and, on the other, how "a search for easy generalization leads to neglect of the 
variety of state forms and political regimes that might be affected by globalization" 
(Jessop 2016: 192), as well as the different responses that each State or each group 
of States presents depending on their level of involvement in the world market:  
 
"States should not be seen as somehow set apart from their respective 
economies, as if they existed in separate spheres and had only external 
relations with each other. On the contrary, normal States are, typically, 
heavily involved […] and in many respects, in shaping the institutions and 
practices that constitute the economy" (Jessop 2016: 192).  
 
This means that it is impossible to think about building a unique model of 
State conduct in the economic field.  
If instead we take a closer look at the recent economic crisis, and at the 
European context, a dominant type of State emerges which Jessop defines as the 
austerity state, "embedded in a political system (polity) that institutionalizes a 
permanent politics of austerity" (Jessop 2016: 236). 
The theoretical level, the second response to the previous question, and which 
moreover we have privileged in our reflection, constitutes a level for the 
recomposition of multiple empirical responses to the underlying question: in a 
reciprocal reference between theory and practice, investigations in the field 
require theoretical revisions; and in turn these theoretical revisions help define 
a model of the State that is partly different from the traditional versions in a 
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circulation: a State which is defined as a complex institutional assemblage and 
a site of political practices "which seek to deploy its various institutions and 
capacities for specific purposes" (Jessop 2016: 246); a model that presupposes 
the renouncement of the idea that the State has a core made of "unitary, 
coherent ensemble of agency" (Jessop 2016: 247); and that the State is historically 
considered to be a political form endowed with peculiar characteristics, but that 
its life takes place within the social environment (of society) and therefore that 
the power of the State and its exercise are always conditional and relational.  
One last mention of the theme of the crisis: also here, by conducting a 
historical review that relies on some classic thinkers, it is possible to place back 
into the collective imagination a broader and more historically profound version of 
crisis which combats the flattening and homogenisation that the current notion 
has experienced. It is enough to think of the numerous social scientists that have 
grappled with the topic of crisis; for example, Koselleck (2006) offers a historical 
fresco of the complex intricacies binding the category of crisis to modernity, 
showing how the term assumed its current, everyday language meaning, especially 
in its economic sense. A sociologist like Wallerstein (1991) reveals how the 
capitalist mode of production produced a systemic crisis from which it is 
difficult to escape without positing particularly daring trajectories, straining our 
predictive capabilities. Lastly, Bourdieu (1998) reveals – in the neighbouring 
semantic field of "family" – how words can become watchwords which we 
obey without the awareness that this obedience does not take us away from the 
abyss of crisis, but contributes to deepening it and to increasing the social misery 
and the inequalities of our society. 
Listening to the voices of the authors mentioned we discover a dual path. 
On one side, the "crisis" as a historically deep and polysemous concept, which 
to be addressed, it is even necessary to deal with hard sciences and revolutionise 
the epistemological framework of social sciences. On the other side, as modernity 
advances, the term "crisis" loses its breadth and its value. The concept of "crisis" 
loses its historical dignity and, precisely because of the economy of which it 
has become a prisoner, it presents itself as a crisis of indifferentiation, as a 
word now devoid of history. Under the noble and high version of the concept 
of "crisis" its poor and monotonous version is hidden, only able to repeat the 
mantra of austerity and prescribing behaviours that bring us closer to the abyss 
instead of moving us away from it.  
The Italian author Barcellona focuses a good deal on this reductionism and 
its dangers and tries to offer solutions for getting out of the dead-end where 
humanity seems to have come:  
 
"the theme of the economic and political crisis needs to be read as a social 
crisis of the connective tissue of society, whose main victims are the 
productive middle class and the working class: we need to understand the 
tendency toward the change of this social, psychological, and economic 
reality, transforming individual aspirations in collective resources capable 
of having a real effect" (Barcellona 2013: 113–4). 
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However, apart from the possible solutions, we feel it would be difficult to 
restore the meaning that "crisis" once had, because the historical and social 
conditions we are living in, and the times we are going through, are profoundly 
poor. Nevertheless, it’s necessary to struggle with the weapons of the word and 
the pen, because intelligence can hope to identify the causes that led to the 
impoverishment of the current notion of crisis only by drawing from history 
and knowledge, and it’s from here that we may start again a process of 
returning to "crisis" the dignity of category it deserves, despite the difficulties 
of the times we are living in.  
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